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RUNNING HEAD: COGNITIVE MECHANISMS FOR FLOCKING                                      
Abstract
Low-level "adaptive" and higher-level "sophisticated" human reasoning processes have 
been proposed to play opposing roles in the emergence of unpredictable collective behaviors 
like crowd panics, traffic jams, and market bubbles. While adaptive processes are ubiquitous 
in mechanistic theories of emergent social complexity, complementary theories understand 
incentives, education, and other inducements to rationality as able to suppress such outcomes. 
We show in a series of laboratory experiments that, rather than suppressing complex 
social dynamics, sophisticated reasoning processes can support them. Our experiments elicit 
flocking behavior in groups and show that it is driven by the human ability to recursively 
anticipate the reasoning of others. We identify this sophisticated flocking in three different 
games—the Beauty Pageant, Mod Game, and Runway Game—across which game theory 
predicts no formal similarity. The persistence of sophisticated flocking across unrelated game 
types not only speaks to the phenomenon's robustness, it also suggests that people are treating 
three supposedly different decision settings as conceptually similar, implicating a second 
sophisticated cognitive ability: human concept formation. We also find in participants' 
underlying reasoning that the number of recursions they perform is limited not by any 
individual's cognitive abilities, but by a social norm that emerges during flocking.
By implicating both recursive reasoning and concept formation in complex dynamics, 
we support interdisciplinary perspectives that emergent complexity  is typical of even the 
most intelligent populations and carefully designed social systems.
Keywords: Complex game dynamics, human collective behavior, behavioral game 
theory, cognitive game theory, iterated reasoning, adaptive learning.
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Introduction
Cultural norms, fads and fashions, and market bubbles and busts are all unpredictable 
phenomena that can emerge spontaneously from disorganized human collectives.1,2 Many 
mechanisms have been invoked to explain these phenomena, particularly lower-level 
reasoning processes such as habits, reactions, emotions, biases, reinforcement, and imitation.
3-12 Complex social dynamics are characterized by the fact that they emerge endogenously 
from agents' interactions and do not converge to static set of strategies. This complexity is a 
major impediment to the design of predictable social systems.8,13,14 but the mechanisms that 
make it manageable remain poorly understood. One scientific tradition, going at least to 
Keynes,15,16 holds that  increasingly rational behavior can impede the emergence of complex 
collective behaviors by counter-acting the influence of our "animal spirits," the adaptive 
processes that supposedly  drive social complexity.17-22 But recent theories challenge this 
narrative by implicating higher-level processes in similarly complex dynamics.23-26 If 
sophisticated human-unique reasoning processes can drive group outcomes spontaneously 
into complex dynamic regimes, then policy interventions that increase agents' motivation, 
knowledge, or intelligence are not sufficient to increase the simplicity  or predictability of real 
world social dynamics.
Sophisticated flocking in repeated games
Theoretical findings from the nonlinear physics community  have shown that simple 
learning mechanisms foster unexpected emergent dynamics in a wide range of economic 
games and models,27-31 particularly in "large" games—those with many players, choices, and 
repetitions. Prominent among interesting emergent, or endogenous, dynamics is flocking, the 
clustering of agents in both their positions and velocities.4,5 In repeated economic games, 
flocking occurs when many agents converge upon the same choices over many rounds of 
play.24,29 Like other collective behaviors, flocking is usually  explained in terms of low-level 
reasoning mechanisms,5,32,33 and relevant studies consequently draw heavily from non-human 
animal collective behavior.4,34-37
We focus here on a collective behavior that we call "sophisticated flocking" that, unlike 
typical flocking, is driven by human higher-level reasoning mechanisms. Sophistication is 
clearest in iterated "what you think I think you think" reasoning,38-41 a process that can cause 
people to disqualify choices that they think others will know they desire. This iterated 
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reasoning is an expression of bounded rationality, and it is often invoked for its ability to 
suppress complex game dynamics associated with flocking.17-20,42
In many games, such as those we investigate herein, this elimination of intermediate 
choices makes players' actual choices appear to "hop" discontinuously through a choice 
space: where a basic reactive agent advances through choices sequentially by  best-responding 
to current state, a sophisticated agent advances more quickly  because it best-responds to the 
anticipated best-responses of others (who, in turn, are best-responding to the anticipated best 
response of it). In these games, a player's depth of iteration can be inferred from the number 
of intermediate strategies that it skips.
Three games
We present  experimental results from three economic games, the well-known Beauty 
Contest and two that we developed, the Mod Game and the Runway Game.
Beauty Contest. In the Beauty Contest, players receive a reward for guessing the 
number 0–100 that  is p (typically p=2/3) of their group's mean guess.38,39,43 The game 
motivates participants to try to iteratively anticipate each other's choices, and people who 
play  it  perform large hops down through the possible choices. Instructively, a researcher can 
infer from players' chosen numbers how many iterations they performed, and, by extension, 
how many iterations they  expected from others: a player who responds to suspected choice 50 
with 22 is, correctly or not, anticipating that others will be less sophisticated and select 33. 
The Beauty Contest  has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, which is to say that it has a 
unique choice—zero—that, when chosen by  everyone, leaves no one wishing they had 
chosen something else. While the Beauty Pageant is well known for eliciting both 
sophisticated hopping behaviors and low-level adaptive responses, flocking has not been 
suspected in the game.
Mod Game. In the Mod Game, n players choose an integer 1–24 (or, more generally, 
m). Choice 1 dominates ("beats") choice 24 while all other choices x (2–24) beat the choice 
x–1 exactly below them; players earn one point for making a choice that is exactly  one above 
another player's, zero points otherwise, with all choices linked circularly as along the 
perimeter of a clock (illustrated in Figure 1.a).24,44 This circular structure is directly 
reminiscent of Rock-Paper-Scissors, which the Mod Game generalizes, and with which it 
shares the same type of solution: a single "mixed strategy equilibrium" that  players can 
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achieve by  selecting choices randomly. Frey and Goldstone find that sophistication and 
flocking coexist in a positive-sum version of the Mod Game.24
Runway Game. We developed the Runway Game to narrow the possible explanations 
for the results of the Mod Game. In both, each of multiple players earns one point for 
choosing a number precisely one above another's number. However, the choice space of the 
Runway Game is defined on the real number line, rather than on a circle of integers. Beyond 
having an unbounded choice space, the game is unusual because, unrepeated, it has no Nash 
equilibrium solution (SI). That said, it can gain one with a very small change, the addition of 
an “outside” choice that guarantees zero earnings. We will see that players are effectively 
indifferent to this change in the solvability of the basic game.
Three game classes, three types of reasoning. Nash equilibrium is a classic definition of 
the stability of game outcomes, and gives one model of rationality. But there are many kinds 
of game equilibria, enough that games can be classified by the solutions they have and the 
different methods used to find them.45 This is important because the formal method that 
solves a game can not only define its type, it can also suggest the style of reasoning a player 
should use when playing it. For example, the mathematical method that formally  solves the 
Beauty Contest, a model of unbounded iterated reasoning, is what first suggested to 
researchers that humans might themselves mentally perform iterations.38 Just as iterated 
reasoning is expected in games solved this way, it is unexpected in games that are solved 
differently.46-48 Specifically, neither the Mod nor the Runway game has a formal solution or 
structure that would predict the iterated reasoning used by players in the Beauty  Contest. The 
formal solution to the Mod Game predicts random behavior, while the lack of a solution to 
the Runway Game means that  there is not a game theoretic prescription for the type of 
reasoning that a player should employ.
Analysis
In the experiments reported below, all three games were repeated for many rounds, and 
all players received anonymized but otherwise full information about each previous round's 
payoff outcomes. In experiments with the Mod and Runway games, we tested both zero- and 
positive-sum versions, such that a player that was scored upon either did or did not lose a 
point for every point gained by the scoring player.
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Our analyses depend on the concepts of rate, through which we identify sophistication, 
and choice distance and rate distance, with which we define flocking. 
We define a player's rate in round t by comparing their current and previous choice. In 
the Mod and Runway games, rate x't = xt – xt-1. Rate greater than one is a proxy for 
sophistication: it reflects an iterated best-response to the anticipated iterated best-response of 
others. Iterated best-response is an established mechanism for the iterative elimination of 
adjacent series of choices that we describe as hopping.
In a game, flocking occurs when a group's members converge on shared choices and 
rates (illustrated in Figure 1.a). It is analogous to flocking in non-human animals, in which 
many animals converge to common positions and velocities. To capture convergence in both 
game "position" and "velocity," we measure a group's choice distance and rate distance, 
respectively, as the mean or median difference between group members' choices and rates 
within a round. We identify flocking as increasing in a group when both of these distance 
measures decrease significantly over time (SI). Under these definitions, sophisticated 
flocking is flocking with hopping (rate greater than one).
Results
Despite the vast formal differences between these games, we robustly  elicit  the same 
sophisticated flocking behavior in all three. 
Mod Game
83 paid participants in 28 groups of size 2–7 played 100 rounds each of positive-sum 
and zero-sum versions of the Mod Game (SI. Interface in Figure S2). Groups quickly  self-
organized into a cyclic collective flocking behavior in which individuals "hopped" together 
around the strategy space (Figure 1). Players had a mean hop size of 2.2, meaning that, on 
average, a player who selected choice 10 in round t tended in round t+1 to play choice 12, or 
possibly 13 (see also Figure S3). Significant decreases in groups' choice and rate distances 
over time (χ21=26; χ21=39.2; both p<0.001; Tables S2–S3, also see Figure 3) reflect a 
convergence upon shared "positions" and "velocities" through choice space that satisfies our 
definition of flocking. These distance measures were significantly larger during zero-sum 
conditions (χ21=40.2; χ21=38.5; both p<0.001; Tables S2–S3), supporting predictions that 
zero-sum settings will suppress complex dynamic regime in adaptive agents 28.
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The rate of 2.2 is consistent with sophistication.  The proximity of players to each other 
in both choices and rate is consistent with flocking. Sophisticated flocking is inconsistent 
with prominent theories of game dynamics, which propose that agents with higher-level 
reasoning should be less susceptible to non-equilibrium flocking in games like the Mod 
Game 17,18,20.
Runway Game
In our first experiment with this game, 59 players in 17 groups of 2–6 played two 75 
round blocks of the game in zero-sum and positive-sum conditions. In a second experiment 
(positive-sum-only; 22 groups of 133 students; two-blocks of 50 rounds each paying either 2¢ 
or 20¢ per point) we modified the base game to give it a solution, a unique Nash equilibrium 
in the form of an "outside option" strategy. The SI discusses details of these and a third 
robustness experiment.
Qualitatively, groups in these Runway experiments tend in initial rounds to cluster on 
single-digit integers above zero before self-organizing into clusters that climb from round to 
round through the positive integers (Figure 2, full data Figure S16). Players hop  up the 
strategy space with a median rate of 3 (mode 2; distribution in Figure S10). They coordinate 
overwhelmingly  on the natural numbers, with only 4.2% of choices being negative or non-
integer. They also flock: the median choice distance in a round was 7 (mode 2) and the 
median rate distance was 6 (mode 1). On these key qualities, behavior in the Runway Game 
is consistent with sophisticated flocking.
The effect of more rounds of experience is in all Runway experiments significantly 
larger hops in later rounds and increased flocking (tighter clustering; χ21=14; χ21=458; 
χ21=593; all p<0.001; Tables S8–S10). Larger groups and higher pay levels are also 
associated with larger hops (χ21=328, χ21=17.4; both p<0.001; Table S8). Zero-sum versions 
of the game show no difference in the magnitude of hopping and decreased clustering in 
choices and rates (χ21=0.08, p=0.77; χ21=91; χ21=58; both p<0.001; Tables S8–S10).
Comparing the results of the two Runway Game experiments, we find that players were 
indifferent to the presence of a Nash equilibrium, selecting it  intentionally in less than 1% of 
rounds (SI) and exhibiting sophisticated flocking in both versions of the Runway Game.
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Beauty Contest
The Beauty  Contest is known for eliciting sophisticated iterated reasoning behavior. 
Since players in the repeated Beauty Contest have multiple rounds to potentially adapt their 
reasoning depths toward each other, we hypothesized that this game also fosters a previously 
unsuspected flocking dynamic. We reanalyzed data from two classic studies of the repeated 
Beauty Contest38,39 to examine whether groups in these experiments had formed flocks. The 
first study  administered 4 rounds with 7 groups of 15–18 people, and the second posed 10 
rounds with 55 groups of 3–7.
It is established that choices in the Beauty Contest become closer to each other as they 
approach zero: from choice 50, iterating to depths one and two yields choices (33 and 22) that 
differ by 11, while starting the same processes from choice 5 yields outcomes that differ by 
just 1.1. However, the choice and rate clustering we propose is over and above this spurious 
type. To measure clustering due specifically to endogenous flock formation, controlling for 
the more trivial mechanism, we normalized choices and rates in each round relative to the 
benchmark set by  the previous round's winning choice (SI). We find evidence for flocking 
over both experiments (via a significant increase in both choice and rate clustering; Figure 3, 
top 2 rows; χ21=25.3; χ21=22.5; both p<0.001; Table S14).
Cross-game evidence for emergent flocking
Figure 3 compares six experiments on three games—three experiments reported here, 
and three reanalyses—to give evidence that flocks emerge in multiple classes of games. A 
linear model over all three games finds increased flocking—lower choice distance and rate 
distance—with time (χ21=85.8; χ21=99.9; both p<0.001; Table S15). Across experiments, we 
see that flocks emerge with or without high pay levels, with or without Nash equilibria, and 
also that they are robust to group  size, subject pool, and both within- and between-session 
experience (SI).
Cross-game evidence for emergent within-group norms
In games that elicit strategic iterated reasoning, players usually  perform only 0–3 
iterations.49 Researchers have long debated whether these limited depths are due to players' 
own cognitive limits, or instead to the limits they expect of others.38,43,50-53 We offer a third 
possibility for when games are repeated: expressed depths of iterated reasoning are a social 
norm that emerges, for each group, as a result of groupmates' previous patterns of mutual 
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adaptation to each other. For example, given two players who adapt their depth of iterated 
reasoning toward each other over multiple rounds, with one initially expressing a depth of 1 
and the other a depth of 5, a few rounds of experience will find them both expressing depths 
of 3. This norm-based theory  of reasoning depth, however subtle, makes clear predictions that 
we support: 1) exhibited depths of reasoning (median hop size) should show great variability 
across groups but remain similar within groups (Figure 4), 2) an individual's depth of 
reasoning iterations should predict the median depth of the rest of their group (χ21=16.8; 
p<0.001), 3) the variation in members' reasoning depths should decrease with time (χ21=171; 
p<0.001), and 4) these patterns should disappear in randomly reshuffled groups (Table S15). 
Experiments that do not show evidence of this norm are the zero-sum Mod Game (perhaps 
because zero-sumness should suppress flocking28) and the 4-round Beauty  Contest (which 
converges quickly). We conclude that each group develops its own customary limit on the 
number of strategic iterations that  members expect each other to perform. This implicit social 
norm on cognitive sophistication develops in parallel with the sophisticated flocking 
collective behavior.
Discussion
One flocking behavior in all games
Players in the Mod Game, Runway Game, and Beauty Contest self-organize a common 
"sophisticated flocking" behavior, even though existing theory does not predict any similarity 
between these three multiplayer games. Since each game affords different  formal solution 
concepts and is expected to evoke different kinds of reasoning, there is no reason to suspect 
any similarity in how they are played.
This argument is clearest for the games in their single-shot forms, but it is true of their 
repeated versions as well. While there is nothing in contemporary game theory that forbids 
one dynamic from appearing across many repeated games (well-known "folk theorems" 
permit virtually  any  pattern of behavior when certain games are repeated indefinitely54), 
failing to forbid a result is different from predicting it, much less explaining it. In this sense, 
established theory cannot account for our findings (SI).
Hopping due to iterated reasoning
The most likely explanation for hopping is that  players come to conceive of these 
games as evoking sophisticated oneupmanship via iterated best response. There are four 
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reasons to support iterated reasoning as the explanation for hopping: 1) the most common 
rates in all three games were consistent with the 1–3 steps of iterated reasoning common in 
the literature;49 2) iterated reasoning provides a more parsimonious and psychological 
explanation than alternative theories (SI); 3) our findings in the Mod and Runway Games 
inspired our successful prediction of flocking in the Beauty  Contest, in which iterated 
reasoning is already well-established as the cause of hopping; and 4) informally, participants 
often mentioned after sessions that they had used iterated reasoning to inform their choices.
Despite these arguments in favor of iterated reasoning in the Mod and Runway games, 
other evidence challenges them as a straightforward mechanism for hopping: 1) there is little 
theoretical justification for invoking iterated reasoning in both games, since neither game is 
amenable to the analytic procedure upon which the psychology of iterated reasoning is 
formally grounded ("iterated deletion of dominated strategies"), 2) players in some groups 
exhibit unrealistically  high levels of iterated reasoning (up to 10 levels), and 3) despite the 
supposedly complex deliberative iterated reasoning process required for increasingly  high 
rates, participants respond in the same unrealistically short amounts of time (within 10 
seconds), regardless of how many iterations they performed.
These conflicts may be resolved if we introduce a distinction between iterated 
reasoning as a cognitive process and iterated reasoning as a "mental model." Suppose that a 
simple decision heuristic (such as "increment previous choice by n") can produce an 
"unsophisticated" hopping behavior superficially consistent with fully deliberative iterated 
"what you think I think you think I think" reasoning. If all players think of each other as 
applying the full process, but each in fact uses the cognitively cheap heuristic, then iterated 
reasoning is no longer applied by anyone as a cognitive procedure for generating behavior, 
but it continues to be applied by everyone as a way of understanding how others play the 
game.
An emergent mental model
We take the reliable cross-game emergence of sophisticated flocking as evidence that 
the Mod Game, Runway Game, and Beauty Contest are all somehow eliciting the same 
mental model from participants.
A mental model is the conceptualization of a scenario within which one decides how to 
reason about it.55,56 Human mental models operate at a very general level of reasoning, and, 
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despite their importance, have had little concrete place in game theory. Their simplest 
expression in game theory is in their influence on whether a social decision is perceived as a 
game at all.57,58 The mental models that govern our daily interactions seem to make strategic 
reasoning rare, even in situations that are formally strategic. For example, when you sit at a 
4-way intersection, are you following the rules of a mundane non-strategic traffic procedure, 
or the dictates of a Machiavellian battle of wills? Each alternative conceptualization implies 
very different prescriptions for how a driver should reason and behave. Mental models can 
also make mundane decisions strategic merely by fearing that others are doing the same: 
surrounding a community of Nebraskan drivers with New Yorkers may make them less 
heedful, even where the rules of the road remain the same. Such self-fulfilling divergences 
between the game we see and the game we are in, between our mental and economic models, 
are ubiquitous, and certain to contribute to the complexity of social systems.
In the case of the three games we examine, a weaker, "mental-model-free" claim might 
suffice to explain emergent flocking in any game considered on its own, but the fact that all 
three engender the same very specific collective behavior seems to imply some unexpected 
conceptual similarity between the games, via a conceptual level of game understanding that 
intercedes between game theory and game behavior.
Whatever commonality  the three games are ultimately  found to share, it will not be 
found in their single-round Nash solutions. The mental models we observe seem to emerge 
without regard for the one-shot formal structures of these games. In the extreme case of the 
Runway Game, participants self-organize the same behavior regardless of whether or not the 
game even has a formal solution. It may be that large games, those with large numbers of 
players, choices, and rounds, can be harder to reason about even when they  are as analytically 
tractable as simple games. Whatever the explanation, the insensitivity of players to formal 
structure challenges the relevance of elementary game-theoretic concepts to more complex 
games.
To explain the emergence of unexpected mental models in the Runway and Mod games, 
we hypothesize that noisy  choices in early rounds incidentally  create small clusters of choices
—ephemeral or dynamically updating focal points—that break the strategic and perceptual 
symmetries of both games in a way that suggests sophisticated flocking. This feedback 
between observed behavior and mental model formation might explain our evidence that 
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players' strategic iterations are limited by  a social norm for how deeply one 'should' reason 
through the reasoning of others (Figure 4). One implication is that people may not be able to 
develop mental models of complex settings before actually experiencing them. If this is true, 
a general understanding of human game behavior will have to include mental models, and the 
processes by which they co-evolve with experience.
Conclusion
In repeated versions of three types of economic game, laboratory groups produce 
sophisticated flocking. Our tests demonstrate the robustness of this behavior over high and 
low payoffs, over multiple populations, and with very  experienced players. These three game 
environments lack any formal resemblance to each other, so the emergence of one collective 
behavior in all three allows us to observe how mental models of social systems develop, 
establishing the importance of cognitive science and complex systems in economic behavior. 
We propose that mental model formation is an active process that can occur during game 
play. And because of the evidence that  emergent social processes limit iterated reasoning 
(rather than the other way around), these games show that sophisticated human reasoning 
processes may be just as likely to drive the complex, oftentimes pathological, social 
phenomena that we usually attribute to reactive, emotional, non-deliberative reasoning. In 
other words, human intelligence may as likely increase as decrease the complexity and 
unpredictability of social and economic outcomes.
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Figures
Fig. 1:
 
Figure 1. Cycles in the Mod Game driven by sophisticated flocking.
Panel a. shows three rounds of a five-player group in a cyclic flocking pattern. These players 
are flocking in the sense that they are proceeding together through the same sequence of 
choices over time. They are sophisticated in the sense that the flock does not advance 
incrementally through choices, but in larger hops. While reactive players best-respond to 
current state and advance through choices one at a time, sophisticated players best-respond to 
the anticipated best-responses of others, and advance more quickly in hops, as we observe. 
Panel b. plots 200 rounds of choices 1–24, laid out  on a circular strategy space, for players 
from two groups. Panel c. depicts simulated data for comparison: a perfect  flock with 200 
hops of size 2 and a sequence of 200 randomly-generated integers 1–24. The spiral patterns in 
b. are consistent with the sophisticated flocking illustrated in the first plot of c. Figure S5 
plots data from all groups (the data in b. are from groups 1 and 5).
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Fig. 2:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Figure 2. Sophisticated flocking in four sessions of the Runway game.
Plots show raw choices over 80 rounds. Each color of point represents a different group 
member. The apparent proliferation of points in initial rounds reflects disorganized behavior 
before groups have formed flocks, which appear in each plot as a line. The slopes of all lines 
are greater than 1, which can occur only when players are best-responding to the recursively 
anticipated best-responses of others. Furthermore, the different slopes of each panel suggest 
differing norms for how players come to expect each other to reason (Figure 4). These 
sessions used a two-block design, with each block lasting 40 rounds (this explains the "reset" 
in panel b). Panels a.–d. represent groups 70–73 of Figure S17. Choices above 500 are 
truncated.
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Fig. 3:
Figure 3. Cross-game evidence for flocking.
We define flocking as within-group, within-
round convergence on both choices (first 
column of both panels) and rates (or hops; 
second column). In the scatterplots of panel a., 
each point represents a distance for a group in a 
round. These plots show that the distances 
between group members' choices and rates 
decrease over time, particularly in the initial 
rounds of play. Beauty  Contests are limited in 
how many  times they can be repeated, but 
flocking is clear in even these short time series. 
The first  three rows of a (in grey) illustrate the 
flocking we identify in previously published 
data 24,38,39, and the last three plots (in color) 
show the data reported herein. Flocking 
increases with time (negative slopes) except in 
zero-sum conditions of the Mod and Runway 
games. Panel b. shows extent of flocking by 
comparing observed flocking to that in 
synthetic reshuffled datasets that randomly 
reassigned participants across groups. Bars 
show standard errors.
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Fig. 4:
Figure 4. Emergent group-level norms.
Both panels present evidence that groups 
developed varying norms for the shared 
depth of recursive reasoning that their 
members exhibited. Greater hop sizes 
correspond to more deeply recursive 
strategic reasoning. Panel a. shows that 
median hop sizes exhibit  both within-group 
homogeneity  (slopes are ~1) and cross-group 
heterogeneity (axes have large domain and 
range). Panel b. shows that the variances in 
groups' hops decrease (green lines), 
particularly in the initial rounds of each 
game, and remains below that  of groups that 
have been randomly reshuffled (orange).
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